The European Union and the war in Sudan

By: Ali Alsadiq Ali,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan.

On Monday, April 8, I read an Op-Ed about the current situation in Sudan jointly written by Mr. Josep Borrell Fontelles, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission and Mr. Janez Lenarčič, European Union Commissioner for Crisis Management.

First and foremost, I appreciate the high-ranking European officials’ interest in what is going on in my country and their concern about the current humanitarian challenges in Sudan. The first step, however, in effectively addressing any problem is to accurately comprehend and describe the problem before seeking to resolve it. The Op-Ed made it abundantly obvious to me that its foundation rested upon an erroneous interpretation of the crisis as well as misleading presumptions that undermined the OP-Ed’s objectivity and fairness. Should this interpretation prevail, the crisis in Sudan will be further exacerbated and human suffering will increase.

Alternative narratives:

The adage goes that the truth is invariably the first casualty of wars. This is due to the distorted alternative narratives spread by those driving the conflict. Whether purposefully or unintentionally, the Op-Ed’s authors fell into this trap. The authors blamed the outbreak of war a year ago on what they dubbed a coordinated military coup in October 2021. Nothing could be further from the truth than this claim! The measures of October 25, 2021, came at the height of a political crisis that struck the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition (FFC), which represented the civilian side in the civil-military partnership established by the Constitutional Document of August 17, 2019, that had subsequently formed two transitional cabinets in September 2019 and February 2021 respectively. The FFC experienced a series of fractures and divisions, resulting in three opposing blocs, amid mutual accusations of violating the Constitutional Document, betraying the revolution’s ideals, and abandoning the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) of October 2020. That crisis disrupted the Transitional Government, as well as the economy and most aspects of normal daily life in the country, due to sit-ins and the closure of public roads, including the land route between Sudan and Egypt, the road to Port Sudan, and the Port itself, which are the lifeline of the nation’s economy. As a result, the October 2021 measures were an attempt to get out of this intractable crisis, particularly after three unsuccessful bids by the transitional Prime Minister to resolve it. Those measures were fully supported by one of the two main FFC blocs, namely the armed movement’s signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA). Nevertheless, the October 2021 measures ended with the agreement reached between the military side and the transitional Prime Minister on November 30, 2021. The latter resumed his responsibilities thereafter. A month later, however, he tendered his resignation due to his inability to reconcile the divergent factions’ views within FFC. Thus, in what way can the conflict that transpired on April 15, 2023 be linked to the events of October 2021?

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